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Babyproofing the House Before the Hurricane: Where We 
Are Missing the Mark 
Anokhy Desai* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article will examine the privacy protections offered to Americans and the 
issues arising from the lack of regulations that specifically protect data privacy. 
Americans have felt the impacts of data breaches annually for over a decade.1 In the 
                                                          
* Anokhy Desai is a J.D. Candidate for the Class of 2022 at the University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law, and M.S. Candidate for the Class of 2022 at Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College of 
Information Systems and Public Policy. She is the Executive Editor of the Pittsburgh Journal of 
Technology Law and Policy, and worked in cybersecurity and privacy prior to law school. Special thanks 
to Professor Jacqueline Lipton, Professor Aleecia McDonald, Erin McCarthy Holliday, Sima Lotfi, and 
Chris Grijalva, for all the feedback and support. 
1 David Stout, AOL Engineer Sold 92 Million Names to Spammer, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/technology/aol-engineer-sold-92-million-names-to-
spammer- us-says.html; Bob Sullivan, Ameritrade Warns 200,000 Clients of Lost Data, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 19, 2005, 3:16 PM), www.nbcnews.com/id/7561268#.X0FoIZNKi8o; E. Scott Reckard & Joseph 
Menn, Insider Stole Countrywide Applicants’ Data, FBI Alleges, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-aug-02-fi-arrest2-story.html; Parija B. Kavilanz, Gap: 
Stolen Laptop Has Data of Job Applicants, CNN MONEY (Sept. 28, 2007, 5:46 PM), https:// 
money.cnn.com/2007/09/28/news/companies/gap/; Monster Attack Steals User Data, BBC NEWS, 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6956349.stm (last updated Aug. 21, 2007); Jan Libbenga, Norway Sends Entire 
Citizenry’s ID Info to Media, THE REGISTER (Sept. 18, 2008), https://www.theregister.com/2008/09/ 
18/tax_office_blooper_shocks_norway/; Robert McMillan, Data Theft Creates Notification Nightmare 
for BlueCross, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 1, 2010, 8:23 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/ 
article/2520155/data-theft-creates-notification-nightmare-for-bluecross.html; Miguel Helft, AT&T Said 
to Expose iPad Users’ Addresses, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/ 
technology/10apple.html; Ilana Greene, Citigroup Data Breach: A Lesson and Warning For All, FORBES 
(June 13, 2011, 10:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanagreene/2011/06/13/citigroup-data-breach-
a-lesson-and-warning-for-all/#7e822fc24817; Blizzard Battle.Net Hack Attack Hits Millions, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19207276; Greg Kumparak, Apple Confirms 
That Its Dev Center Has Been Breached By Hackers, TECHCRUNCH (July 21, 2013, 6:43 PM), https:// 
techcrunch.com/2013/07/21/apple-confirms-that-the-dev-center-has-potentially-been-breached-by-
hackers/; Brian Fung, A Snapchat security breach affects 4.6 million users. Did Snapchat drag its feet on 
a fix?, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2014, 11:16 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 
2014/01/01/a-snapchat-security-breach-affects-4-6-million-users-did-snapchat-drag-its-feet-on-a-fix/; 
Kate Vinton, With 56 Million Cards Compromised, Home Depot’s Breach Is Bigger Than Target’s, 
FORBES (Sept. 18, 2014, 8:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2014/09/18/with-56-
million-cards-compromised-home-depots-breach-is-bigger-than-targets/; Kate Vinton, CVS Investigates 
Credit Card Breach At Its Online Photo Service, FORBES (July 17, 2015, 2:41 PM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/07/17/cvs-investigates-credit-card-breach-at-its-online-photo-
service/; Eric Lichtblau, Hackers Get Employee Records at Justice and Homeland Security Depts., N.Y. 
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past few years, the impact and number of those breaches have increased, 
compromising millions of Americans’ informational privacy.2 The right to privacy 
                                                          
justice-and-homeland-security-depts.html; Lily Hay Newman, Security News This Week: The Deloitte 
Breach Was Worse Than We Thought, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ 
security-news-of-the-week-deloitte-sonic-whole-foods-breach/; Sarah Perez & Zack Whittaker, 
Everything You Need To Know About Facebook’s Data Breach Affecting 50M Users, TECHCRUNCH 
(Sept. 28, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/28/everything-you-need-to-know-about-
facebooks-data-breach-affecting-50m-users/; Rob McLean, A Hacker Gained Access To 100 Million 
Capital One Credit Card Applications And Accounts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/ 
capital-one-data-breach/index.html (last updated July 30, 2019, 5:17 PM); Anthony Spadafora, Hundreds 
of millions of Instagram, TikTok, YouTube accounts compromised by data breach, TECHRADAR (Aug. 21, 
2020), https://www.techradar.com/news/hundreds-of-millions-of-instagram-tiktok-youtube-accounts-
compromised-by-data-breach. 
2 David Stout, AOL Engineer Sold 92 Million Names to Spammer, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/technology/aol-engineer-sold-92-million-names-to-
spammer-us-says.html; Bob Sullivan, Ameritrade Warns 200,000 Clients of Lost Data, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 19, 2005, 3:16 PM), www.nbcnews.com/id/7561268#.X0FoIZNKi8o; E. Scott Reckard & Joseph 
Menn, Insider Stole Countrywide Applicants’ Data, FBI Alleges, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-aug-02-fi-arrest2-story.html; Parija B. Kavilanz, Gap: 
Stolen Laptop Has Data of Job Applicants, CNN MONEY (Sept. 28, 2007, 5:46 PM), https:// 
money.cnn.com/2007/09/28/news/companies/gap/; Monster Attack Steals User Data, BBC NEWS, 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6956349.stm (last updated Aug. 21, 2007); Jan Libbenga, Norway Sends Entire 
Citizenry’s ID Info to Media, THE REGISTER (Sept. 18, 2008), https://www.theregister.com/ 
2008/09/18/tax_office_blooper_shocks_norway/; Robert McMillan, Data Theft Creates Notification 
Nightmare For BlueCross, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 1, 2010, 8:23 PM), https:// 
www.computerworld.com/article/2520155/data-theft-creates-notification-nightmare-for-bluecross.html; 
Miguel Helft, AT&T Said to Expose iPad Users’ Addresses, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/technology/10apple.html; Ilana Greene, Citigroup Data Breach: A Lesson 
and Warning For All, FORBES (June 13, 2011, 10:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanagreene/ 
2011/06/13/citigroup-data-breach-a-lesson-and-warning-for-all/#7e822fc24817; Blizzard Battle.Net 
Hack Attack Hits Millions, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
19207276; Greg Kumparak, Apple Confirms That Its Dev Center Has Been Breached By Hackers, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 21, 2013, 6:43 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2013/07/21/apple-confirms-that-the-
dev-center-has-potentially-been-breached-by-hackers/; Brian Fung, A Snapchat security breach affects 
4.6 million users. Did Snapchat drag its feet on a fix?, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2014, 11:16 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/01/01/a-snapchat-security-breach-affects-4-
6-million-users-did-snapchat-drag-its-feet-on-a-fix/; Kate Vinton, With 56 Million Cards Compromised, 
Home Depot’s Breach Is Bigger Than Target’s, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2014, 8:21 PM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2014/09/18/with-56-million-cards-compromised-home-depots-breach-
is-bigger-than-targets/; Kate Vinton, CVS Investigates Credit Card Breach At Its Online Photo Service, 
FORBES (July 17, 2015, 2:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/07/17/cvs-investigates-
credit-card-breach-at-its-online-photo-service/; Eric Lichtblau, Hackers Get Employee Records at Justice 
and Homeland Security Depts., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/us/ 
hackers-access-employee-records-at-justice-and-homeland-security-depts.html; Lily Hay Newman, 
Security News This Week: The Deloitte Breach Was Worse Than We Thought, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2017, 
8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/security-news-of-the-week-deloitte-sonic-whole-foods-breach/; 
Sarah Perez & Zack Whittaker, Everything You Need To Know About Facebook’s Data Breach Affecting 
50M Users, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 28, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/28/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-facebooks-data-breach-affecting-50m-users/; Rob McLean, A Hacker Gained 
Access To 100 Million Capital One Credit Card Applications And Accounts, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach/index.html (last updated July 30, 
2019, 5:17 PM); Anthony Spadafora, Hundreds of millions of Instagram, TikTok, YouTube accounts 
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feels fundamentally American and has been repeatedly defended in our legal history, 
yet nowhere in our Constitution does it explicitly say all Americans have such a right. 
To combat this conflict between the amount of privacy we expect and the amount we 
experience, the United States should enact data privacy legislation similar to the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Congress must 
provide an agency, such as the FTC, the power to create and maintain an enforceable 
comprehensive model data privacy regulation. A codified national regulation would 
allow the American public to hold the private sector accountable for misusing their 
data and breaching their informational privacy. Section I of this Article offers an 
overview of privacy in American legal history and case law, global regulatory 
models, and some notable privacy regulations. Section II explores where those 
regulatory models and the consumer experience are lacking. In Section III, I take 
lessons learned from existing privacy regulations and propose a suggested mitigation 
for the national data privacy problem. Finally, Section IV provides concluding 
thoughts. 
I. PRIVACY LAW 
A. In American Legal History 
Privacy has long existed as a legal concept in torts, property law, and, arguably, 
the Constitution. Over the last century, the Supreme Court has considered a 
progression of cases which expanded individual privacy rights protected by certain 
constitutional amendments.3 While the Court has relied on frameworks, like Justice 
Rehnquist’s “history and traditions” test to determine whether specific liberty rights 
are afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court in 
Lawrence indicated that the list of privacy issues protected by the Constitution may 
grow as an outcome of changing times and the growth associated with each 
generation.4 History and traditions should be treated merely as “the starting point but 
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”5 
1. The Legal Notion of Privacy 
The legal notion of privacy protections can be found in multiple legal subject 
areas, including torts and property law. Noted torts scholar William Prosser 
                                                          
3 See infra note 10. 
4 Larry J. Pittman, The Elusive Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 19 NEV. L.J. 135, 
142. (2018). 
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originally categorized invasion of privacy into four groups within tort law.6 These 
include: intrusion upon a plaintiff’s seclusion, solitude, or private affairs; public 
disclosure of private facts; publicity that places a plaintiff in false light; and 
appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness.7 Within this categorization, a breach 
of informational privacy would fall under public disclosure of private facts. “Unlike 
libel or slander, truth is not a defense for invasion of privacy.”8 If this is interpreted 
to include modern technology, it would inculpate firms whose databases of personal 
information, like home addresses and health information, are breached, and just 
because that published or leaked information about individuals is true does not 
absolve the firm from invading those individuals’ personal privacy. 
In property law, the castle doctrine is the closest analogy to privacy protections. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the castle doctrine as an “exception to the [rule to 
withdraw from a dangerous situation] allowing the use of deadly force to protect 
one’s own home and its inhabitants from attack, especially from a trespasser who 
intends to commit a felony or inflict serious bodily harm.”9 The doctrine allows an 
individual to protect their private property from unauthorized entrants. Broadly 
interpreted to include modern technology, it would give individuals the right to 
protect their information from attack, placing the responsibility to safeguard 
individuals’ information on firms. 
2. The Supreme Court’s Holding on Privacy 
Though the right to privacy does not appear explicitly in the Constitution, The 
Supreme Court has historically interpreted the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to include such protections. A number of 20th and 21st century Supreme 
Court cases form the foundation for what privacy means in the digital age.10 
In Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ 1890 law review article, “The Right to 
Privacy,” a soon-to-be-appointed Justice Brandeis describes the “right to be let 
alone” as being able to live one’s private life in peace, specifically in the context of 
                                                          
6 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
8 The Right to Privacy, WAY BACK MACHINE—INTERNET ARCHIVE (May 14, 2012), https://web 
.archive.org/web/20120514050702/http://www.cvc.sunysb.edu/334/ethics/Privacy.html (citing an article 
from SUNY Stony Brook that is no longer available). 
9 Castle Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
10 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); 
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protecting individual privacy from becoming publicized.11 His description of the 
principle of protecting individual privacy directly aligns with the data privacy 
regulations called for by this Article. The Fourth Amendment mirrors this principle 
by providing a “right . . . to be secure” against unreasonable government intrusion.12 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty similarly supports the argument 
that the right to privacy exists in the Constitution.13 These two Amendments are the 
primary focus of the following cases. 
a. Olmstead v. United States (1928) 
In Olmstead, the petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to violate the 
National Prohibition Act.14 Prohibition officers gathered evidence of this illegal 
activity by wiretapping the phone lines of four of the petitioners.15 The Court held 
that because the physical wiretaps were located along phone lines on public property, 
the evidence was collected without trespassing upon the individuals’ properties, and 
thus the search did not require a warrant and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.16 
Justice Brandeis dissented, stating that because the government itself conceded 
that wiretaps constitute a search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment requires 
warrants for such searches.17 Additionally, he pointed out that the wiretaps 
essentially forced the petitioners to act as witnesses against themselves, violating the 
Fifth Amendment.18 Despite the “subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy . . . available to the Government,”19 Brandeis continues, the founding fathers 
intended to protect “the right to be let alone,” and thus “every unjustifiable intrusion 
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”20 
                                                          
11 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
13 Pittman, supra note 4, at 141–52. 
14 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455. 
15 Id. at 456–57. 
16 Id. at 469. 
17 Id. at 471–72. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 473. 
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Brandeis’ interpretation was soon upheld in Katz, which overturned 
Olmstead.21 In Katz, FBI agents placed listening and recording devices outside the 
public phone booth the petitioner made calls from.22 The Court held that this 
wiretapping, though conducted on a public phone booth with “no physical [trespass] 
to the area occupied by the petitioner,”23 was unconstitutional and violated the Fourth 
Amendment, because the Amendment “protects people—and not simply “areas”—
against unreasonable search and seizures . . . .”24 
b. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
The defendants, a director of a medical clinic and a doctor, were convicted of 
violating a state law that prohibited them from dispensing birth control devices to 
married couples.25 The Court reversed the convictions, holding that the privacy rights 
implicit in the Bill of Rights protected the decisions made in one’s private life.26 The 
Court discussed the privacy protections in the Third Amendment’s right to refuse to 
quarter soldiers without consent, the Fourth Amendment’s right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-
incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment’s right to have rights not enumerated in the 
Constitution.27 The majority also touched on the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection 
of liberty and First Amendment’s freedom of speech and press as fundamental 
personal rights, concluding that “the First Amendment has a penumbra where 
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”28 
c. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 
Essentially a rehashing of Roe v. Wade,29 Planned Parenthood asked the 
question of whether a state’s anti-abortion statute violated the Due Process Clause.30 
The Court reaffirmed Roe’s main holding, clarifying that this Constitutional 
protection of a woman’s decision over her pregnancy “derives from the Due Process 
                                                          
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967). 
22 Id. at 348. 
23 Id. at 359. 
24 Id. at 353. 
25 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
26 Id. at 493. 
27 Id. at 479–86. 
28 Id. at 483–87. 
29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause contains an inherent 
right to privacy that protects a woman’s choice to have an abortion). 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 It declares that no State shall ‘deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ The controlling word 
in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”32 
d. Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 
The respondents, four physicians who treated terminally ill patients, believed 
Washington state’s classification of assisted suicide as a felony was unconstitutional 
under the Due Process Clause.33 The Court disagreed, stating that it “has regularly 
observed that the [Due Process] Clause specially protects those fundamental rights 
and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”34 
Though the ruling seemed contrary to the earlier protections of some bodily 
and decisional autonomy prescribed in Planned Parenthood, the focus on the 
“history and traditions” test showed the Court’s consistency in the two decisions. 
The right to assist another individual’s suicide did not track with societal norms, but 
the privacy rights inherent in bodily and decisional autonomy did. 
e. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
The Court considered whether a Texas statute that made it illegal for 
individuals of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct violated the Due 
Process Clause.35 It held that the statute was unconstitutional, a holding consistent 
with the Griswold and Roe clarifications of the liberty and personal decision-making 
protections in the Fourteenth Amendment.36 While same-sex marriages were not yet 
legal at the time, the “history and traditions” test indicated that prior holdings had 
paved the way for Fourteenth Amendment protections for intimate relations between 
same-sex couples.37 The majority wrote: 
“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. . . . They knew times can blind us to certain 
                                                          
31 Id. at 846. 
32 Id. 
33 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707–08 (1997). 
34 Id. at 703. 
35 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
36 Id. at 564–67. 






B A B Y P R O O F I N G  T H E  H O U S E  
Volume XXI—2020-2021 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can 
invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.”38 
f. Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 
Building on Glucksberg and Lawrence, the Court in Obergefell expanded on 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest and held that the Amendment protected 
same-sex couples’ right to marry.39 Echoing Lawrence, the Court stated, “[h]istory 
and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. . . . 
That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone 
to rule the present.”40 
g. Riley v. California (2014) 
An officer stopped the petitioner for a traffic violation and searched his person 
and phone.41 The officer noticed that the petitioner used certain terminology in his 
texts linking him with a gang and potentially with a recent shooting.42 During his 
trial for multiple convictions resulting from that evidence, the petitioner contended 
that the search and seizure of his phone were performed without a warrant and that 
the associated evidence taken from his phone was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and thus inadmissible.43 The Court agreed and required that police 
officers must obtain a warrant before searching cell phones and digital devices.44 
While statutes may not account for the vast quantity of sensitive personal information 
now held on smart phones, the fact that modern day individuals carry around this 
amount of personal data instead of hiding it at home does not make their privacy 
“any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”45 
                                                          
38 Id. at 578–79. 
39 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). 
40 Id. at 664. 
41 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378–79 (2014). 
42 Id. at 379. 
43 Id. 
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h. Carpenter v. United States (2018) 
One of four men suspected of armed robbery was arrested and provided his cell 
phone to the FBI.46 The FBI used phone numbers of the other participants found 
therein to obtain cell phone location records that placed the other three men, 
including the petitioner, at the robbery, leading to six counts of robbery and other 
charges.47 The petitioner asserted that because his physical location was collected 
through cell phone location records that were obtained without a warrant, his Fourth 
Amendment right was violated.48 Restating Riley and explaining that a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy includes not expecting to have physical 
movements tracked through cell phone records, the Court held that the warrantless 
acquisition of cell phone records violated the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right. 
The Court referred back to Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead, writing, “the Court is 
obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress of science’ does 
not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”49 
B. In Practice 
Understanding the regulations currently protecting or failing to protect 
Americans’ privacy depends on understanding the terms commonly used within 
them. An organization or entity that collects and stores data is a controller, while the 
entity that processes that data for business purposes like advertising or internal 
analytics is a processor.50 An entity can sometimes be both the controller and the 
processor.51 An individual whose data is being collected is a data subject, and data 
that contains personal information that can be traced back to that individual is 
personal data, and can sometimes qualify as personally identifiable information 
(PII).52 The granularity of the definition of PII varies between regulations and even 
organizational policies. 
The European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
in May of 2018 to protect the personal data and privacy rights of individuals in the 
                                                          
46 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 2223 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928)). 
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EU.53 GDPR contains 99 articles detailing privacy and technology rules that make 
other national privacy regulations pale in comparison, most of which are not 
discussed in this paper for brevity; however, a few examples are outlined below to 
illustrate its breadth and approach.54 
An update to the 1995 EU Privacy Directive that required data processing, 
collection, and retention be limited, recommended Privacy by Design—privacy that 
is integrated into organizational processes from the inception of those process, and 
allowed data subjects to be able to edit their data to maintain a certain level of privacy 
and consent from the data subject. By creating this update, GDPR added a new right 
of data portability.55 
Data portability allows the data subject to request their data be moved from one 
controller’s databases to another’s.56 Not only are entities with at least 250 
employees required to comply with GDPR, they also must employ a Data Protection 
Officer to provide expertise on data protection laws and procedures.57 Small 
businesses with fewer than 250 employees are still required to be GDPR-compliant 
if they regularly process the personal data of international data subjects.58 GDPR also 
mandates that controllers report any security breach where data was stolen, changed, 
lost, or accidentally disclosed “within 72 hours of discovery,” one of the strictest 
breach notification requirements in the world right now.59 The fine for being 
noncompliant is up to €20 million or 4% of annual revenue, whichever is higher. 
Other countries have taken inspiration from GDPR and enacted similar 
regulations. South Africa enacted the Protection of Personal Information Act 
(POPIA) in November 2013.60 Though it went into effect first, parts of POPIA were 
borrowed directly from released GDPR drafts.61 Despite this, its scope is 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION, https://gdpr-info.eu/ (May 25, 2018) [hereinafter 
GDPR]. 
55 What Is GDPR, The EU’s New Data Protection Law?, supra note 50; 1995 O.J. (L 281) 9. 
56 RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY, https://gdpr-info.eu/art-20-gdpr/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
57 Article 30 Records of Processing Activities, EU GDPR (last visited Feb. 21, 2020), http://www 
.privacy-regulation.eu/en/article-30-records-of-processing-activities-GDPR.htm. 
58 Id. 
59 CONTROLLER AND PROCESSOR, https://gdpr-info.eu/chapter-4/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
60 Russell Nel, GDPR Matchup: South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act, IAPP 
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jurisdictionally much more limited than GDPR; POPIA applies to the personal 
information of data subjects and legal entities processed in South Africa, while 
GDPR applies to the personal data of all data subjects from EU member countries, 
regardless of where that data is collected or processed.62 All businesses, no matter 
the size, must have a Data Protection Officer and report breaches “as soon as 
reasonably possible.”63 Finally, organizations within South Africa that do not follow 
POPIA are fined up to 10 million ZAR, which is roughly 3% of GDPR’s maximum 
fine.64 
Within the United States, California was the first state to enact a comparable 
privacy law. While every state has its own breach notification rule,65 no other state 
has passed a thorough privacy regulation.66 The California Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA) was signed in 2018 and went into effect on January 1, 2020.67 CCPA adds 
onto current state laws, providing for further privacy protections for state residents.68 
Organizations that have at least $25 million in revenue, have personal information 
from at least 50,000 residents, devices, or households, or make 50% or more of their 
annual revenue from selling resident data must comply with CCPA. These rules 
cover many companies that GDPR would not. The fine for noncompliance is $7,500 
per intentional violation, and $2,500 per unintentional violation that is not addressed 
within thirty days of notice.69 In order to comply, companies can create an inventory 
of California resident data that has been collected or processed, create California 
resident-facing sites, create a toll-free hotline for residents to submit requests to 
access their data, provide a “Do Not Sell My Information” link on their site’s 
homepage, update their privacy policy and data collection processes, and proactively 
determine the age of their data subjects to avoid being fined for collection of data 
from minors, among other privacy-protection measures.70 Reading through the other 
California Civil Code sections, it becomes clear that CCPA is not simply based off 
of GDPR, but also builds on it. CCPA includes basic privacy requirements that can 




65 For example, ALA. CODE § 8-38-12, TEX. CODE ANN. § 2054.1125. 
66 Lothar Determann, Analysis: The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, IAPP (July 2, 2018), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/. 
67 Id. 
68 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-.199 (West 2018). 
69 Id. § 1798.155. 
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be found in GDPR, as well as stricter elements like requiring organizations to have 
a hotline for data subjects, broadening the definition of “personal data,” and 
widening eligibility requirements for organizations that must comply. 
C. Global Models 
At the beginning of this decade, over eighty countries had data protection 
frameworks in place.71 As of the end of 2019, fifty-two more countries have joined 
that list.72 These countries have employed one or more of four models: the 
comprehensive, sectoral, co-regulatory, or self-regulatory model.73 
Countries that follow the comprehensive model “govern the collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal information” through an agency or other data protection 
authority (DPA).74 The EU’s GDPR is a notable example of the comprehensive 
model; GDPR acts as a one-size-fits-all regulation that certain businesses worldwide 
must employ to be compliant and avoid fines. Each EU member country has its own 
DPA, which in turn answers to the EU DPA. 
Countries that follow the sectoral model govern only certain aspects or types of 
personal information. The sectoral model protects privacy by enacting laws that 
require companies within certain industries to take data protection measures. Like 
the comprehensive model, the sectoral model uses data protection authorities. The 
United States enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) in 1996 to address the use and disclosure of individual health information 
and provide a privacy standard for medical and health information.75 The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) ensures accountability to HIPAA 
and is responsible for updating the act as needed.76 
Co- and self-regulatory models both involve a mix of governmental and 
independent institutions that protect personal information. Industries use the co-
regulatory model to enforce privacy and data protection standards in conjunction 
                                                          
71 Graham Greenleaf, Global Tables of Data Privacy Laws and Bills, 157 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. 
INT’L REP., Jan. 2019, at 1, 1–15. 
72 Id. 
73 PETER SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVACY: LAW AND PRACTICE FOR 
INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS 31 (International Association of Privacy Professionals 2012). 
74 Id. 
75 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013). 
76 HIPAA Updates, HIPAA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/category/hipaa-updates/ (last updated 
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with existing national and state laws.77 Ireland, for example, allows for codes 
produced by trade associations and other industry groups to go into effect after being 
approved by the Data Protection Commissioner and both houses of Parliament.78 In 
some countries, industries use the self-regulatory model to enforce standards without 
the basis of existing laws. This model can be successful in some cases, such as the 
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard. In 2006, American Express, 
Discover Financial Services, JCB International, and Visa Inc. formed the PCI 
Security Standards Council to enforce global payment card security standards like 
protecting cardholder data and maintaining an information security policy, among 
other controls.79 
II. MISSING THE MARK 
A. Where the Models are Lacking 
While it is not necessarily a weakness that the comprehensive model may be 
too strict for companies that do not collect or process PII or high-risk personal data, 
critics point out that the bureaucratic and financial resources required to implement 
such a model successfully are often hard to obtain and outweigh the risk of personal 
data being exfiltrated or otherwise compromised.80 One finds support for this when 
considering how small the list of countries is where the comprehensive model has 
been successful; so far, only the European Union has implemented privacy 
regulations on this scale.81 Even then, over one quarter of the EU member states were 
not prepared for GDPR when the deadline arrived.82 GDPR has also faced thousands 
of proposed amendments since its enactment reflecting administrative costs that 
smaller governments, like those of U.S. states, could struggle with.83 However, the 
                                                          
77 See AHMAD & SWIRE, supra note 73, at 33. 
78 Section 13 Data Protection Act (1988) (Ir.), www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1988/ act/25/section/13/ 
enacted/en/html. 
79 A.M. Parker, An Introduction to PCI DSS, CRYPTOMATHIC (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www 
.cryptomathic.com/news-events/blog/an-introduction-to-pci-dss. 
80 See AHMAD & SWIRE, supra note 73. 
81 See GREENLEAF, supra note 71. 
82 Nikolaj Nielsen, Eight Countries to Miss EU Data Protection Deadline, EU OBSERVER (May 18, 
2018), https://euobserver.com/justice/141860 (stating “Despite having two years to get their domestic 
legal acts sorted, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Slovenia will not be ready until far beyond the 25 May deadline.”). 
83 EU Council Presidency Releases Proposed Amendments to Draft ePrivacy Regulation, HUNTON 
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tradeoff to these costs is that strict protections are better for user privacy, and changes 
across industries and jurisdictions can be enacted through a single body. 
The sectoral model works best when different industries are regulated based on 
the risk level of the information they handle. For example, health information should 
have stricter privacy protection requirements than retail purchase information. A 
downside of using the sectoral model is that regulations that are not regularly updated 
can face the same privacy issues they strive to prevent due to the lag time between 
when a new technology is released and when an update to the regulation is written, 
edited, agreed upon, and finally enacted.84 For instance, it took seven years for the 
Privacy Rule85 and Security Rule86 to be added to HIPAA. For those seven years, 
there were no rules within the act making it mandatory for institutions to obtain 
patient authorization for the use and disclosure of their private health information, 
giving patients the right to examine and request copies of their health records, or 
requiring health data to be encrypted.87 In 2009, the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act was introduced, requiring privacy 
health vendors like Google Health and Microsoft HealthVault to provide breach 
notifications when private health information is accessed or exfiltrated by 
unauthorized parties.88 While impressive that gaps in HIPAA’s privacy protection 
were filled every few years to address new technologies, this is often not the case in 
countries that follow the sectoral model. More often than not, due to the same 
financial and bureaucratic resources necessary for the comprehensive model, and to 
the rotating door of political regimes that provide those resources, the sectoral model 
quickly lends itself to becoming an outdated source of loopholes for noncompliant 
organizations. An example of this is the U.S.’s Privacy Act of 1974, controlled by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). According to the Department of Justice (DoJ), 
the act “governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information 
about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies.”89 
Some important and forward-thinking measures the act put in place include 
providing individuals notice about which governmental agencies have their 
information, prohibiting individual data disclosure without obtaining the individual’s 
                                                          
84 See AHMAD & SWIRE, supra note 73, at 32. 
85 See HIPAA § 264(a), 110 Stat. 2024 at 2033. 
86 See HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. 2024 at 2033–34. 
87 The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. (last visited Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.hhs 
.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html. 
88 See AHMAD & SWIRE, supra note 73, at 32. 
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consent or meeting one of twelve statutory exceptions, and creating a way for 
individuals to access and amend their data.90 Unfortunately, no updates regarding 
new technologies have been made to the Privacy Act since its creation almost 50 
years ago. This means the act has not been modernized to reflect the informational 
privacy concerns arising from the invention of the Internet. The FTC has not 
extended this act to cover the private sector either. 
Meanwhile, the co-regulatory model is more of a theory than a reality.91 In co-
regulation, agencies and industry groups theoretically collaborate to develop policies 
that, in the best case scenario, are approved by the government to become national 
law.92 Ireland’s Data Protection Act, for example, has a code about breach 
notifications that the Office of Data Protection Commission (ODPC) treats as best 
practice, rather than authoritative laws the private sector must abide by.93 All ODPC-
approved codes have otherwise been geared to the public sector.94 Even with 
GDPR’s delineation of co-regulatory rules, it is unclear whether Ireland has taken 
steps towards compliance by solidifying its co-regulatory practice.95 
Lastly, the self-regulatory model has its own accountability issues. Even the 
most notable instance of self-regulation was motivated by consequences laid out in 
existing regulations. PCI DSS was created because the increase in credit card fraud 
and scams at the time, in conjunction with the Truth in Lending Act’s (TILA) 
stipulation that the credit card companies were liable for large fraudulent charges, 
meant the companies had to take immediate action to stop losing money.96 While 
industry-developed policies like PCI DSS can be updated for modern technology 
relatively quickly but since the policies do not have to undergo multiple passes of 
governmental scrutiny, there is no incentive to update policies if the current version 
mostly addresses modern issues. There is no requirement or monetary incentive to 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 980 (2016). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (citing PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO IRISH AND EU LAW 12–
17, 71 (2010)); DATA PROTECTION ACT 2003 (Act No. 6/2003) (Ir.) (last visited Feb. 21, 2020), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/ en/act/pub/0006/index.html. 
94 DATA PROTECTION COMM’R, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER OF 
IRELAND 11 (2014), https://www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/ 2018-11/Annual% 
20Report%202014.pdf. 
95 See McGeveran, supra note 91, at 981; GDPR arts. 40–43 (2018). 
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update them.97 Additionally, the strength of enforcement may not be appropriate in 
all cases; violating an industry regulation on software updates may carry the same 
hefty fine as failing to follow data retention policies.98 Finally, industries that are 
allowed to create their own regulations will do so based on the incentives of profit 
or shareholder benefit rather than based on the concern for civil rights that 
presumably animates governmental agencies. While PCI DSS seems like a success 
for the self-regulatory model, these companies only had an incentive to protect user 
privacy because other governmental regulations (TILA) tied that privacy to their own 
profits. This illustrates why in most other cases, industries simply fail to protect their 
users’ data. 
B. Where the Consumer Experience Is Lacking 
When a consumer signs up for a new service, he or she must agree to the terms 
and conditions and privacy policy to finish the account creation or application 
installation process. Regardless of whether the new account is for a social media site 
or a banking app, the user must agree to that company’s policies if they wish to use 
the service. More often than not, users will click the “Agree” or “Okay” button to 
continue without reading the policies. It is understandable that users do not read 
about how their privacy may be infringed if they finish creating their account; 
privacy policies are intentionally dense and unnecessarily long. To meet industry 
guidelines, companies will often add boilerplate language to their privacy policies 
without any trimming or editing, making it harder for the average user to understand 
how this language applies to them and their intended use of the product. On top of 
this, longer terms and conditions can be used to disincentivize the user from 
discovering what exactly they are agreeing to.99 
Carnegie Mellon University professor and former Chief Technologist of the 
Federal Trade Commission Lorrie Faith Cranor found that it would take more than 
200 hours for the average Internet user to read all of the privacy policies for all the 
websites they visit each year, not including third-party advertiser and analytics 
policies that users implicitly accept just by visiting those websites.100 Nationally, that 
equates to an estimated economic loss of $365 billion per year.101 In his study about 
public knowledge of technology and the web, University of Pennsylvania 
                                                          
97 See AHMAD & SWIRE, supra note 73, at 34. 
98 Id. 
99 See generally Aleecia McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 
4 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008). 
100 Id. at 563. 
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communications professor Joseph Turow found that “most people don’t actually read 
privacy policies” and assume that the title implies it describes how a company will 
keep user information private.102 Turow confirms that privacy policies are filled with 
technical jargon clearly not meant for consumers.103 One of the questions in Turow’s 
study asks users to determine if the following statement is true or false: “When a 
company posts a privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps confidential all 
the information it collects on users.” 52% of Internet users incorrectly believed this 
statement was true.104 
Based on these studies, users believe that companies that update or have privacy 
policies are actively protecting user privacy, when in fact they may be exposing that 
data to breaches or selling it to third parties. If companies are protecting user privacy 
as consumers believe, then the user has no reason to read through the unnecessarily 
complex and lengthy policies they are required to accept to begin or continue using 
a company’s services. If consumers do not read these policies, they are unlikely to 
object to them. If there are no objections, companies have no incentive to improve 
these policies, and therefore they remain vulnerable or continue selling user data. 
The private sector relies on this negative feedback loop to avoid implementing more 
robust protections for user privacy. 
III. DISCUSSION AND MITIGATION 
A. Lessons Learned from Existing Regulations 
Before GDPR was implemented, American companies that faced data breaches 
had to update their state’s Attorney General, follow that state’s breach notification 
laws, and notify shareholders and the affected parties. That may seem tedious, but 
pre-GDPR, this process did not carry any significant fines or punishments for what 
was often technological irresponsibility or a lack of proper data security measures. 
In the now infamous Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook allowed third-party 
developers to access user data and target users, all without user consent.105 Before 
GDPR went into effect, the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) fined 
Facebook only £500,000, despite the over 1 million UK users who were affected and 
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£31.5 billion the company made that year in global revenue.106 Facebook’s fine pales 
in comparison to the fines given to unsecured companies after GDPR was enacted. 
International airline British Airways and international hospitality chain Marriot were 
the first culprits to receive GDPR fines, facing totals of £183 million and £99 million 
out of their £13 billion107 and £16 billion108 yearly revenues, respectively, for 
breaches of customer data.109 If Facebook had been fined today, it would have owed 
up to £1.26 billion, or 4% of its revenue, making the fine less of a slap on the wrist 
and more of an accountability check for the social media giant, as well as an example 
to others. Companies can no longer respond to a breach with an apology email and 
no formal security updates. The GDPR and future CCPA fines are more than an 
annoyance—they are a reminder that there are real consequences to allowing data 
breaches to occur. 
Another way regulations can protect users lies in the language they use. The 
wording in GDPR and POPIA is clear in places and approaches legalese in others. 
This does not come as a surprise, as both regulations are laws. The issue with using 
legal language to describe data privacy, a technical concept with technical solutions, 
is that legal writing “contains vague, general wording that actually means very little 
unless read in a specific context . . . and clear absolute statements from which no 
variation seems possible.”110 If laws are vague and absolute in the wrong places, 
compliance becomes more difficult and user privacy suffers. 
Article 24 of GDPR states “the controller shall implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that 
processing is performed in accordance with this Regulation.”111 Article 6 allows 
companies to continue to process personal data if they have “a legitimate interest” in 
processing that data.112 In this case, it is up to the controller to decide what solution 
is appropriate enough to comply with the regulation while ensuring the data that is 
                                                          
106 Id. 
107 IAG ANNUAL REPORT (2018) (last visited Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.iairgroup.com/~/media/ 
Files/I/IAG/documents/annual-report-and-accounts-2018-interactive.pdf. 
108 Marriott Int’l, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018), https://marriott.gcs-web.com/ 
static-files/8799734e-b9e0-4e53-b194-7bd24a381118. 
109 Dan Swinhoe, The Biggest Data Breach Fines, Penalties, and Settlements So Far, CSO (Oct. 23, 
2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3410278/the-biggest-data-breach-fines-penalties-and-
settlements-so-far.html?nsdr=true. 
110 Christopher Kuner et al., The Language of Data Privacy Law (And How It Differs from Reality), 
6 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 259, 259–60 (2017). 
111 GDPR, supra note 54 at art. 24 (emphasis added). 
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processed is still usable and is legitimately important to their company. Similarly, 
the language in POPIA requires breaches to be reported “as soon as reasonably 
possible,” which can be interpreted as narrowly or broadly as the breached 
company’s DPO would like, and not necessarily in a way that would protect user 
privacy the most.113 
GDPR protects not just EU citizens, but “data subjects,” a term which includes 
EU citizens, residents, and in some cases, anyone else who has performed a 
transaction with an EU business. Unlike POPIA’s breach notification clause, this 
intentionally vague terminology clearly benefits consumers as it forces EU 
businesses to comply with the regulation for all of their data and not just that of 
citizens.114 The protective intent behind “data subjects” is confirmed in and clarified 
by specific language elsewhere in the regulation.115 
The specific language in GDPR requires companies to provide a breach 
notification within seventy-two hours of discovering a security issue not just when 
data is stolen, but when it is changed, lost, or accidentally disclosed.116 Scenarios 
under which notification is required benefit consumers because previously no notice 
was required unless illicitly accessed data was actually stolen. 
However, if the language in this section was even less specific and included all 
instances of unauthorized access by a third party, economic principles support the 
conclusion that consumers would be even better protected. Two conditions of perfect 
competition in economics, which allows idealized free markets to operate most 
efficiently, are that services are truly interchangeable, or homogenous,117 and that 
consumers have perfect information.118 If the first condition is assumed to be true 
and consumers are given full knowledge about the collection and use of their 
information, they can then compare privacy practices across all available substitute 
companies that provide that service. Full transparency about privacy practices allows 
                                                          
113 Russell Nel, GDPR Matchup: South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act, IAPP 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-south-africas-protection-of-personal-information-
act/. 
114 See infra note 115. 
115 Art. 3(2) states “This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who 
are in the Union.” Art. 3(1) states: “This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the 
context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of 
whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.” 
116 GDPR § 4. 
117 See generally JOHN BLACK, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2d ed. 2003). 
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consumers to make better choices because it forces companies to compete for 
business from the consumer by updating and maintaining privacy practices that are 
favorable to users. Companies would try to improve their data protection because it 
would ostensibly increase their revenue, and consumers would benefit from choosing 
the service that provides the most privacy. To provide consumers with the most 
privacy, the proposed U.S. regulation would then need to prioritize transparency 
about their privacy practices. 
One thing to keep in mind is that there are some services, like the social media 
site Facebook or the LGBT dating app Grindr, that do not have true substitutes. The 
necessity for a critical mass of users on these sites means that their services are not 
interchangeable with any would-be competitors, thus true competitors do not 
actually exist on the market. This is a problem for consumers because both 
companies have faced multiple data breaches.119 Yet these companies have no 
incentive to enact full security and privacy mitigations because consumers have no 
substitute to turn to, and simply have to accept the level of security and data privacy 
those apps provide. Such companies without competitors have no incentive to self-
regulate. Separately, there are websites like Reddit that have a strong enough brand 
loyalty from their consumer base that users would likely continue using their site 
even if they do no more than the required minimum to protect consumer privacy. 
Since its “go-live” date, GDPR has had mixed reactions. A survey was 
conducted in the United Kingdom to assess the public’s reaction to GDPR three 
months after enactment.120 Fifty-seven percent of consumers felt they had a better 
understanding of how companies used their personal data, and 65% believed it had 
not changed their experience with brands they use.121 What is shocking is that 90% 
of the respondents thought they had witnessed brands acting unlawfully and trusted 
those brands less as a result.122 This means that shortly after the deadline, consumers 
                                                          
119 Janet Burns, Report Says Grindr Exposed Millions of Users’ Private Data, Messages, Locations, 
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Do’s and Don’ts of Location Aware Apps; A Case Study, SYNACK (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:00 PM), https:// 
www.synack.com/blog/the-dos-and-donts-of-location-aware-apps-a-case-study/; PCMag Staff, Grindr 
Hack Leaves Hundreds of Thousands Exposed, PCMAG (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.pcmag.com/archive/ 
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felt they better understood how their data was being used, and while it did not change 
their daily experience, this new understanding of how little user privacy companies 
actually protect negatively affected their trust. In the year after the GDPR deadline, 
consumers submitted 4,113 privacy complaints in Ireland alone, UK companies 
reported a total average of 500 breaches per week, and the ICO assigned €56,000,000 
in fines to ninety-one noncompliant companies.123 The increase in reporting metrics 
from both consumers and companies demonstrates the efficacy of a comprehensive 
model for privacy regulation in addressing abuse. 
CCPA may not be a national law, but it still affects more businesses than just 
those within the state. Any business that collects, uses, or processes the data of 
California residents must comply with CCPA. Additionally, the intentionally vague 
definition of “personal information” as “any information that . . . relates to . . . a 
particular consumer or household” requires more companies to comply with the act 
and protects the privacy of more consumers than would be covered by a narrower 
definition.124 While the existence of CCPA does not mean other states will 
immediately follow suit with equally strict regulations, other states like Washington 
and Illinois are already in the process of creating their own privacy bills.125 As of the 
end of 2019, Maine has signed a bill into law, which will go into effect in July of 
2020.126 Each additional state that enacts such a law will bring its own compliance 
costs and challenges for businesses to navigate. 
One issue to keep in mind with state-specific privacy laws is that certain states 
would require companies to comply with their stricter privacy protection rules, which 
might drive businesses that do not want to or cannot afford to comply into another 
state that does not have such a requirement. While states should also consider 
whether the rigidity and penalties in their privacy laws may squash innovation, 
privacy has value separate from profit. Furthermore, states can look to the example 
of Silicon Valley companies that have not left the state and continue to be profitable 
despite CCPA. 
                                                          
123 Philip Lee, One Year Later, Is GDPR Working?, LEXOLOGY (May 27, 2019), https://www 
.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1679e81c-bd6e-4445-8841-e09170289596. 
124 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (2020). 








B A B Y P R O O F I N G  T H E  H O U S E  
Volume XXI—2020-2021 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










B. What We Can Do 
High-impact breaches have become more prolific every year.127 In 2017, 
Equifax faced a security breach that exposed the personal information of 147 million 
people.128 In 2018129 and 2019,130 Facebook faced multiple security breaches, 
affecting over 600 million total accounts. In 2019, Capital One faced a security 
breach that exposed over 100 million Americans’ credit applications with distinct 
private information like Social Security Numbers.131 Despite the severity of these 
annual breaches, there has not been a single national regulation to address the lack 
of data privacy protections. 
It is true that the word “privacy” does not appear in the Constitution. Justice 
Scalia previously asserted that the Court should not assume that there is a 
constitutional right to informational privacy, as there is no such right explicitly 
provided for in the Constitution.132 The Court in Katz even states that the “Fourth 
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”133 
However, that immediately precedes a statement equating the “right to be let alone 
by other people” to “the protection of [man’s] property and of his very life.”134 
While the Court in Katz does argue for privacy regulations to remain the 
responsibility of the states, in modern times, that solution would not adequately 
protect Americans. Just as the Court in Furman v. Georgia put a moratorium on the 
ability of states to impose the death penalty, so can the federal government decide 
that states should not have the primary role in creating baseline privacy 
regulations.135 The moratorium enforced by Furman reflected the view that states 
                                                          
127 See supra note 1. 
128 FTC EQUIFAX DATA BREACH SETTLEMENT, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/refunds/equifax-data-breach-settlement (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
129 Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50 Million Users, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-
breach. html. 
130 April Glaser, Another 540 Million Facebook Users’ Data Has Been Exposed, SLATE (Apr. 3 
2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/04/facebook-data-breach-540-million-users-privacy.html. 
131 Brian Krebs, What We Learn from the Capital One Hack, KREBS ON SECURITY (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/. 
132 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 159–60 (2011). 
133 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
134 Id. at 350–51. 
135 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238–40 (1972) (The Court placed a moratorium on states’ 
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were not properly protecting their citizens’ rights. It was lifted when states passed 
laws one by one to meet the Court’s standard of protection. With privacy in the age 
of the Internet, however, states would pass potentially conflicting patchwork laws, 
each of which would bring additional compliance and uncertainty costs to 
businesses, and thus to citizens. Because of this, states are unlikely to reach a 
satisfactory standard of privacy protection on their own. 
Having patchwork state laws without a national comprehensive-model privacy 
regulation as the baseline to build off of is like babyproofing the beach house as a 
hurricane threatens the coast. It is a good solution for the wrong problem, which 
makes it the wrong solution for this problem. 
Tech companies like those behind the Committee to Project California Jobs, an 
Amazon, Microsoft, Uber, and Google-funded group that lobbied against CCPA, 
object to this kind of regulation.136 They claim it would squash innovation if enacted 
now, and that any such regulation can wait.137 America has witnessed laws lag behind 
demand for social change before. Support for LGBT marriage has been steadily 
increasing for sixteen years. The plurality of U.S. adults supported LGBT marriage 
in 2011,138 but it was only recently addressed by the Court in 2015.139 Similarly, 
support for privacy regulation in the United States is already very high. In fact, in a 
2019 Pew study, 79% of Americans stated they were concerned about the way their 
data was being used by companies and 81% felt they had very little or no control 
over the data that companies collected about them.140 Sixty-three percent of 
Americans said they understand very little or nothing at all about the current data 
privacy regulations in place.141 Given this sentiment and the constant plague of 
privacy issues such as breaches and login credential theft, we should not let the 
enactment of these regulations lag any further. 
                                                          
by failing to give citizens adequate due process and life/liberty rights, until states enacted specific death 
penalty laws that were not cruel and unusual and involved better due process.). 
136 Colin Lecher, Amazon, Microsoft, and Uber are Paying Big Money to Kill a California Privacy 
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Americans support having new privacy regulations—regulations that would 
inevitably come with new costs. However, enacting a comprehensive privacy 
regulation would not give companies carte blanche to displace costs to customers. 
There is discontentment with the current privacy climate in the United States, but 
that does not mean that consumers are willing to directly pay for improvement. The 
Center for Data Innovation found that only one in four Americans would pay a 
monthly subscription fee for companies like Facebook and Google to collect less of 
their data.142 And that is completely understandable—America should improve 
privacy protections in a way that minimizes the cost to consumers. 
The best way to minimize these costs is to craft a national privacy regulation 
using the comprehensive model. The cost companies will face to comply with CCPA 
over the next decade is forecasted to be up to $16.4 billion.143 For companies to 
“absorb” that kind of cost, they would inevitably offload some of it onto the 
consumer. Companies that have a presence in multiple states will face an even higher 
bill when they take into account the costs associated with each state’s privacy laws. 
If more states continue to enact patchwork data privacy bills, the compliance costs 
and potential conflicts will further harm our economy and increase uncertainty. 
Instead, Congress should pass a law that expands the role of the FTC, 
empowering them to protect consumers’ privacy not just from government agencies, 
as provided in the Privacy Act of 1974, but also from increasingly powerful private 
entities. This would allow the FTC, which has become the most influential regulating 
force on information privacy in the United States,144 to create and enforce new, 
relevant regulations to serve as a national baseline for privacy protections. States 
would then have the option to further build upon these protections. The agency would 
update terms to match modern technological, data security, and privacy 
developments, and would pass new rules that no one in 1974 could have foreseen the 
need for. The new regulation would deal not only with privacy but also with security, 
as privacy cannot exist without proper security. “The fact that security implements 
privacy is a critical point often lost in legal (and other) scholarship and policy 
                                                          
142 Daniel Castro & Michael McLaughlin, Survey: Few Americans Willing to Pay for Privacy, CTR. 
FOR DATA INNOVATION (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/01/survey-few-americans-
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143 CALIFORNIA DOJ OAG, STANDARDIZED REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: CAL. CONSUMER 
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debate . . . .”145 Adequate data privacy is interconnected with good cybersecurity 
practices. 
The proposed national privacy regulation would cover a necessary minimum 
set of requirements American businesses over a certain revenue mark must meet, like 
encrypting data, both at rest and in motion, using the most current government-
approved encryption mechanism.146 It is true that there are real costs associated with 
making such a change. The ICO’s staff increased roughly 30% to almost 650 
contract-based employees because of GDPR, with 722 permanent staff.147 The ICO’s 
annual costs also increased from £27 million to £43 million.148 It would thus make 
sense for the government to encourage compliance by providing subsidies for small 
businesses that may not be able to afford such technical protections. Because the 
proposed regulation would cover basic privacy essentials, it would be up to the 
states’ discretion to add more stringent rules that businesses in those states would 
comply with as well, but a national baseline would minimize such variation. The 
federal regulation would act as a floor for privacy protections. Additionally, the 
language in the new regulation should be in plain text with the only room for 
interpretation existing in the consumers’ favor, and should be reviewed every four 
or so years. 
Finally, there should be a contingency plan, in case specific rule enactment does 
not occur on time. When HIPAA was enacted, HHS, the agency responsible for the 
regulation, was given a deadline with a contingency plan if it failed to enact an 
appropriate version of the Privacy Rule. If it failed to revisit the privacy question 
within thirty-six months, HHS would be directed to promulgate regulations149 
consistent with basic “broad stroke” aspirational goals laid out in the HIPAA.150 
                                                          
145 See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 354–55 (2014). 
146 Author note: SHA-1 encryption is still considered proper encryption despite its replacement 
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148 Id. 
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Similarly, there can be a failsafe built into the process in case the FTC fails to 
properly update the protections in the 1974 Privacy Act to more technologically 
appropriate rules. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In just the first two months of 2020, there have already been six breaches 
affecting over 206 million records.151 No fines have been levied and no consequences 
have been faced. One of the breached companies stated they were “encourag[ing 
their] customers to remain vigilant in reviewing charges on their payment card 
statements,” illustrating that the cost displacement problem costs consumers time 
and stress as well as money.152 It is because of issues like this that Congress should 
afford the FTC the power to create and enforce an updated national privacy 
regulation that would serve as a baseline for data protections. Having a baseline gives 
states the option to enact additional more specific laws if they so choose. That way, 
even if states do nothing more, citizens’ data privacy can still be sufficiently 
protected. 
This Article calls on congressional power to protect Americans’ data privacy 
because the executive and judicial branches are not well positioned to make an 
impactful change to our current privacy landscape. The executive branch can only 
act within the bounds of laws Congress has already passed. The more outdated the 
law under which they are acting, the more difficult it is for the executive branch to 
produce anything meaningful. Additionally, the lag in changes made through the 
judicial branch is particularly harmful when dealing with something that evolves as 
rapidly as data privacy. Even if the Supreme Court holds that Americans have the 
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specific right to informational privacy, it is not a bureaucratic body that can produce 
detailed laws to reflect that ruling.153 
While CCPA is a step in the right direction and is a better option for those it 
protects than no privacy protections at all, it was produced somewhat haphazardly 
using the resources of only one state. The reach and experience of a national 
bureaucratic agency would allow for a more thorough and systematic regulation. 
Further, states rarely need to consider the international impact their laws may have, 
leading to laws that are tailored to only their own criteria. CCPA created certain 
loopholes both despite and because of its specific language; Google and Facebook 
still claim that they are exempt from providing users a way to opt out of the sale of 
their personal data, because they do not technically “sell” user data but merely share 
it.154 This example will inevitably encourage other tech companies to similarly 
subvert the spirit of the law. The past several decades have shown that this kind of 
abuse is rampant. With more of daily life relying on the Internet and with the breach 
count increasing every year, Americans deserve to have their privacy protected 
sooner rather than later. The near-constant threat to informational privacy and the 
unwillingness of companies to protect it mandates a comprehensive national 
regulation to secure the constitutional right to privacy in the 21st century. 
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